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53 
NOTE 
Regulating Ammonium Nitrate Fertilizer 
Under the General Duty Clause 
Drew Levinson* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In April 2013, an explosion at an ammonium nitrate fertilizer 
facility in West, Texas killed 14 people and injured hundreds of 
others.1  The blast devastated the small community, destroying 
“nearly 200 homes, three nearby schools, a nursing home, and an 
apartment complex”.2  Videos of the explosion went viral, 
showcasing the huge fireball and powerful explosion that 
registered 2.1 on the Richter scale.3  The explosion at the West 
Fertilizer Company joins a growing list of similar accidents. In 
2001, 30 people were killed, 2500 injured, and 10,000 buildings 
were heavily damaged in an explosion at an ammonium nitrate 
facility in Toulouse, France.4  In 1994, an explosion killed four 
 
 * Pace University School of Law J.D. & Environmental Law Certificate 
Candidate, 2016; Bachelors of Arts degree in Environmental Studies and a 
minor in Management and Business from Skidmore College, 2012. The author 
would like to thank the Pace Environmental Law Review editors and associates 
for their work on this note.  
1. U.S. GAO, GAO-14-274, CHEMICAL SAFETY: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE 
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF FACILITIES WITH AMMONIUM NITRATE 1 (2014), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-274 [http://perma.cc/28LX-494Y] 
[hereinafter CHEMICAL SAFETY]. 
2. Id. 
3. Ann Zimmerman et al., A Grim Day for a Small Town, WALL STREET. J., 
(Apr. 18, 2013, 10:08 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732 
4493704578429943017835664 [http://perma.cc/BB5E-3SB3].  
4. U.S. EPA, EPA-550-F-15-001, CHEMICAL ADVISORY: SAFE STORAGE, 
HANDLING, AND MANAGEMENT OF SOLID AMMONIUM NITRATE PRILLS 3 (2015), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/an_advisory_6-5-
15.pdf [http://perma.cc/N9V5-QY6K] [hereinafter CHEMICAL ADVISORY]. 
1
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workers and injured eighteen people at an ammonium nitrate 
factory in Port Neal, Iowa.5  Despite these horrific accidents, only 
modest revisions have been made to federal ammonium nitrate 
regulations since 1971.6  Even with growing public support for 
increased safety regulations at ammonium nitrate fertilizer 
facilities, it is unlikely any federal action will result in today’s 
difficult legislative environment. However, the statutory 
authority to regulate these facilities may already be in place. This 
Article explores how the Clean Air Act’s (“CAA”) general duty 
clause can be utilized to prevent catastrophes such as the 
explosion in West, Texas.7 
Part II of this Article describes the dangers associated with 
ammonium nitrate. More specifically, it looks at prior accidents to 
understand the magnitude of these unanticipated explosions. 
Part III looks at our current approach to regulating ammonium 
nitrate fertilizer and the shortcomings of this regulatory regime. 
Part IV provides an overview of the CAA’s general duty clause. 
Furthermore, it describes how the general duty clause can be 
applied to ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities and the 
corresponding obligations imposed upon these facilities. 
II. DANGERS OF AMMONIUM NITRATE 
Ammonium nitrate is a chemical compound consisting of 
ammonia, salt, and nitric acid, which can be produced in a solid, 
liquid, or gas form.8  The substance is widely used in fertilizer, as 
well as in explosives.9  As a fertilizer, ammonium nitrate provides 
an inexpensive source of nitrogen for plants, which increases 
growth and crop yields.  Generally, ammonium nitrate is 
considered to be a safe and stable substance.10  However, the 
combination of confined storage space and high temperatures can 
 
5. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 6. 
6. See id. at 23. 
7. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 16. 
8. See Fertilizer Product Fact Sheet: Ammonium Nitrate, FERTILIZER INST., 
https://www.tfi.org/sites/default/files/documents/t702-032812-3-c7_12-13-
13_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/66X2-W863].  
9. CHEM. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION OFFICE, U.S. EPA, EPA 
550-F-97-002d, CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT: EXPLOSION HAZARD FROM AMMONIUM 
NITRATE 1 (1997) [hereinafter CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT]. 
10. Id. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/3
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transform ammonium nitrate into an explosive substance due to 
rapid or thermal decomposition.11 
At a temperature of 337 degrees Fahrenheit, ammonium 
nitrate begins to melt and undergo decomposition.12  Thermal 
decomposition creates toxic gasses containing ammonia, nitric 
acid, and nitrogen oxides.13  Confined storage spaces can cause 
these gasses to accumulate, increasing pressure to dangerous 
levels.14  Unable to dissipate, the heat and pressure produced by 
thermal decomposition can result in an unanticipated release of 
gaseous byproducts and the detonation of ammonium nitrate.15  
As temperatures increase through this process, decomposition 
rates continue to rise, creating a spiraling effect.16  In addition to 
temperature, the rate of decomposition of ammonium nitrate is 
affected by the concentrations of nitric acid, water, and 
ammonia.17  Elevated levels of nitric acid increase ammonium 
nitrate decomposition, while high concentrations of water and 
ammonia inhibit decomposition.18  When temperatures exceed 
500 degrees Fahrenheit, ammonium nitrate decomposition is 
overtaken by a homolytic mechanism.19  Homolytic decomposition 
causes ammonium nitrate to dissociate into two fragments, 
releasing nitric acid gas and additional heat.20  The rapid 
production of nitric acid significantly lowers pH levels, 
destabilizing ammonium nitrate and further increasing 
decomposition rates.21  When ammonium nitrate is stored in 
large quantities, localized areas of homolytic decomposition or 
 
11. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 4–5. 
12. Id. at 4. 
13. See id. 
14. Id. at 5. 
15. See id.   
16. Id. 
17. Willis A. Rosser et al., The Kinetics of Decomposition of Liquid 
Ammonium Nitrate, 67 J. PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 1753, 1754 (1962). 
18. See id. at 1754–55. 
19. See K.R. Brower et al., Evidence for Homolytic Decomposition of 
Ammonium Nitrate at High Temperature, 93 J. PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY 4029, 4033 
(1989). 
20. See id. at 4029. Homolytic fission is a form of decomposition where a 
molecule dissociates into two neutral fragments. Homolysis, COLLINS ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2012).   
21. Rosser et al., supra note 17, at 1755. 
3
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high temperatures may be sufficiently confined by the total 
quantity to initiate an explosion.22 
Furthermore, detonations of ammonium nitrate-based 
products are more likely to occur under certain conditions, 
including “confinement or self-confinement (when stored in 
relatively large quantities), contamination (presence of 
impurities) and thermal source (fire or explosion for example).”23  
Contamination is particularly dangerous.24  For example, the 
presence of carbon black—a highly combustible organic 
material—in a storage container can increase the decomposition 
rate of ammonium nitrate by more than seven orders of 
magnitude.25  “The density, particle size and concentration of 
solid [ammonium nitrate] in a material, as well as the presence of 
other additives,” all affect the hazardous state of this 
compound.26  To truly understand the dangerous potential of 
ammonium nitrate, one need only look at the history of 
ammonium nitrate production and the catastrophic failures that 
have occurred at these facilities in the past. 
A.  S.S. Grandcamp, Texas City, Texas 
On April 16, 1947, approximately 2300 tons of ammonium 
nitrate detonated on board the S.S. Grandcamp after the vessel 
caught fire while docked in the Port of Texas City.27  The initial 
blast triggered a chain reaction of further fires and explosions 
that leveled Texas City, killing 581 people and injuring more than 
 
22. CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT, supra note 9, at 2; see CHEMICAL ADVISORY, 
supra note 4, at 5. 
23. Nicolas Dechy et al., First Lessons of the Toulouse Ammonium Nitrate 
Disaster, 21st September 2001, AZF Plant, France, 111 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
131, 134 (2004).  
24. Id. (“Dangerous reactions may occur between [ammonium nitrate] and 
products such [as]: halogenated (specially chlorinated) compounds; 
combustible/organic materials; [and] divided metals, specially in contact with 
molten [ammonium nitrate].”). 
25. See B.A. Lurie & Chang Lianshen, Kinetics and Mechanism of Thermal 
Decomposition of Ammonium Nitrate Powder under the Action of Carbon Black, 
in 36 COMBUSTION, EXPLOSION, & SHOCK WAVES 607, 607 (2000). 
26. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 5. 
27. See generally FIRE PREVENTION & ENG’G BUREAU OF TEX. & THE NAT’L 
BD. OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS, TEXAS CITY, TEXAS, DISASTER (1947), 
http://www.local1259iaff.org/report.htm [http://perma.cc/7EVH-Q7LN] 
[hereinafter TEXAS CITY ACCIDENT REPORT].  
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/3
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3500 others.28  In all, the accident resulted in property damage of 
roughly $100 million, or $1.06 billion in today’s terms.29 
B.  Terra Fertilizer Plant, Port Neal, Iowa 
On December 13, 1994, two massive explosions leveled 
portions of the Terra ammonium nitrate production facility in 
Port Neal, Iowa. The blast killed four plant workers and seriously 
injured eighteen others.30  The accident resulted in the release of 
approximately 5700 tons of anhydrous ammonia into the air and 
approximately 25,000 gallons of nitric acid into the soil.31  Offsite 
discharges continued for approximately six days following the 
explosion, resulting in significant contamination of the 
groundwater under the facility.32  Estimates of the damage 
caused by the accident are “in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars.”33 
Investigations revealed unsafe plant operations and poor 
maintenance procedures were the cause of the explosion.34  Terra 
had never completed a process hazard analysis of its ammonium 
nitrate production, nor did it have formal safe-operation 
procedures.35  Moreover, many of Terra’s employees were 
unaware of the hazards of ammonium nitrate36 and therefore 
unable to safely respond to an emergency situation. These factors 
 
28. This Day in History: Fertilizer Explosion Kills 581 in Texas, 
HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fertilizer-explosion-
kills-581-in-texas [http://perma.cc/ZJR3-5ETC]. 
29. Id. 
30. Explosion of the Terra Ammonium Nitrate Plant, Port, Neal, Iowa, 1 J. 
FAILURE ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 22, 22–25 (2001), http:// 
products.asminternational.org/fach/data/fullDisplay.do?database=faco&record=1
898&trim=false [http://perma.cc/7XBA-JF97] [hereinafter Explosion of Terra 
Plant]. 
31. REGION 7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE & REMOVAL BRANCH, U.S. EPA, 
CHEMICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT: TERRA INDUSTRIES, INC. NITROGEN 
FERTILIZER FACILITY PORT NEAL, IOWA 1 (1996) [hereinafter CHEMICAL ACCIDENT 
INVESTIGATION REPORT: TERRA INDUSTRIES].  
32. Id.  
33. Explosion of Terra Plant, supra note 30, at 22.  
34. CHEMICAL ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT: TERRA INDUSTRIES, supra 
note 31, at 94. 
35. Id. at 2. 
36. Id. at 2. 
5
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resulted in conditions necessary for ammonium nitrate to 
detonate.37 
C.  AZF Facility, Toulouse, France 
In September 2001, an explosion at the Azote de France 
(“AZF”) ammonium nitrate fertilizer facility in Toulouse, France 
killed thirty-one people and injured thousands others.38  The 
explosion created a crater roughly 200 feet in diameter and 
twenty-three feet deep.39  The detonation could be felt fifty miles 
away, and shattered every window within two miles of the 
factory.40  More than 11,000 homes were seriously damaged, and 
seventy schools were closed as a result of the blast.41  Property 
damage from the explosion exceeded three billion dollars.42  
Furthermore, acid clouds spewed into the air, hospitalizing 
approximately 800 people with burns or internal injuries.43  
Nearby towns and villages were unable to drink tap water for 
several days because the plant had contaminated the nearby 
Garonne River.44 
The AZF factory, one of France’s largest petrochemical 
plants, stored roughly 30,000 tons of ammonium nitrate at the 
 
37. See id. at 2.  
38. Carol Matlack, Texas Fertilizer Explosion Recalls French Disaster, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-
04-18/texas-fertilizer-explosion-recalls-french-disaster [http://perma.cc/VL65-
JJEK].  
39. FRANÇOIS BARTHELEMY ET AL., REPORT OF THE GENERAL INSPECORATE FOR 
THE ENVIORNMENT: ACCIDENT ON THE 21ST OF SEPTEMBER 2001 AT A FACTORY 
BELONGING TO THE GRANDE PAROISSE COMPANY IN TOULOUSE 6 (2001). 
40. See id. at 7; AZF Plant Explosion, SOS CATASTROPHES, http://www.sos-
catastrophes.eu/AZF-plant-explosion-76 [http://perma.cc/5L3E-MJP4]. 
41. Luis Bravo de la Iglesia, Conclusions Drawn from the Toulouse 
Accident: Application to Loss Estimation for Explosions, TREBOL, at 6, http:// 
www.mapfre.com/ccm/content/documentos/mapfrere/fichero/en/trebol-en-num23-
2.pdf [http://perma.cc/9UZD-2Y6Z].  
42. Carol Matlack, Texas Fertilizer Explosion Recalls French Disaster, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-
04-18/texas-fertilizer-explosion-recalls-french-disaster [http://perma.cc/VL65-
JJEK].  
43. Marlise Simons, French Search for Cause of Chemical Plant Explosion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/25/world/french-
search-for-cause-of-chemical-plant-explosion.html, [http://perma.cc/3HP4-YJ4R]. 
44. Id. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/3
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site.45  The explosion occurred in a storage tank used to stow 
downgraded ammonium nitrate before it was recycled.46  At the 
time of the explosion, the tank contained 300 tons of ammonium 
nitrate, although experts estimate only forty to eighty metric tons 
actually detonated.47  While the root cause of the explosion 
remains unknown,48 many believe ammonium nitrate 
contamination is likely the cause of the Toulouse accident.49 
Regardless of the specific cause, the accident could have been 
mitigated, if not avoided altogether, with better safety equipment 
and procedures. However, “the risk of an explosion was not 
considered important by the site’s security.”50  The facility was 
not fitted with a fire detection system, nor did it have any 
nitrogen oxide detectors.51  The presence of either “would help to 
reduce the time taken to raise the alarm and consequently the 
time taken to put any fires out.”52  Additionally, the facility’s 
infrastructure was in poor condition and largely unmonitored.53  
The few monitoring systems in place were run by sub-contractors, 
creating a greater disconnect in communication between 
employees and decision makers.54  European lawmakers reacted 
strongly, amending previous legislation to include lessons learned 
from the AZF disaster.55 
 
45. BARTHELEMY ET AL., supra note 39, at 3. 
46. Id. at 5. “The ‘downgraded’ products came principally from the 
ammonium nitrate production and packaging workshops for producing 
fertili[z]ers or industrial ammonium nitrate; the downgrading could be linked to 
irregularities in the particle size and also to the composition of the products.” 
Id.. 
47. Id. at 5–6. 
48. Id. at 6. 
49. Dechy et al., supra note 23, at 134. 
50. Simons, supra note 43 (quoting Michel Bŕeard, Toulouse’s prosecutor). 
51. BARTHELEMY ET AL., supra note 39, at 5 (noting devices were present on 
other larger storage facilities on the site). 
52. Id. 
53. See id. 
54. See id. 
55. See Directive 2003/105/EC, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2003 Amending Council Directive 96/82/EC on the 
Control of Major-accident Hazards Involving Dangerous Substances, 2003 O.J. 
(L 345) 1, 1 (EU), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= 
CELEX:32003L0105&from=EN [http://perma.cc/9ENA-SHDH]. 
7
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D.  West Fertilizer Facility, West, Texas 
On the evening of April 17, 2013, a wooden warehouse caught 
fire at the West Fertilizer facility in West, Texas.56  Firefighters 
rushed to the site unaware of the explosive potential of the 
approximately sixty tons of fertilizer-grade ammonium nitrate 
stored inside the warehouse.57  Heated by the warehouse fire, the 
ammonium nitrate suddenly detonated.58  “A shock wave, 
traveling faster than the speed of sound, crushed buildings, 
flattened walls, and shattered windows.”59  The explosion killed 
twelve emergency responders, and at least two members of the 
public.60  More than 200 others were seriously injured from the 
blast.61  While the financial damage caused by the accident is still 
being assessed, “total damages to the town may exceed $230 
million, an unimaginable blow to a town of just 2800 residents—
more than $80,000 for each man, woman, and child living in 
West.”62 
The explosion at the West Fertilizer facility was preventable 
and should have never occurred.63  The facility failed to take 
necessary steps to avert a preventable fire, which ultimately 
triggered the deadly explosion.64  West Fertilizer kept its 
ammonium nitrate in wooden bins, which were stored inside a 
wooden warehouse without a sprinkler system.65  These highly 
combustible storage conditions directly contributed to the 
 
56. Oversight of Federal Risk Management and Emergency Planning 
Programs to Prevent and Address Chemical Threats, Including the Events 
Leading Up to the Explosions in West, TX and Geismar, LA: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) [hereinafter Statement 
of Moure-Eraso] (statement of Rafael Moure-Eraso, Chairperson of the United 
States Chemical Safety Board).  
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 2. 
63. Manny Fernandez, Lax Oversight Cited as Factor in Deadly Blast at 
Texas Plant, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/ 
23/us/lack-of-oversight-and-regulations-blamed-in-texas-chemical-
explosion.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/F4HN-HVKF] (quoting Rafael Moure-
Eraso, the chairman of the Chemical Safety Board). 
64. Id. 
65. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 1. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/3
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intensity of the warehouse fire that detonated the ammonium 
nitrate fertilizer.66  However, “[n]o federal regulations exist 
preventing a company from storing [ammonium nitrate] in such a 
way.”67  Furthermore, local planning committees did not have an 
emergency response plan in place for the West Fertilizer 
facility.68  As a result, the volunteer firefighters responding to the 
fire were unaware of the dangerous potential of ammonium 
nitrate and, therefore, unable to safely control the fire.69 
III. CURRENT REGULATION OF AMMONIUM 
NITRATE 
“Ammonium nitrate fertilizer storage falls under a 
patchwork of U.S. regulatory standards and guidance—a 
patchwork that has many large holes.”70  No single set of U.S. 
standards or guidance prohibits or discourages many of the 
factors that likely contributed to the disaster in West, Texas.71  
For example, “storage of ammonium nitrate in combustible 
wooden buildings and bins is permitted across the U.S.—exposing 
ammonium nitrate to the threat of fire.”72 
Despite these known dangers, OSHA and EPA do not require 
fertilizer facilities to report their ammonium nitrate holdings.73  
While OSHA has set out some basic requirements for the storage, 
use, and transportation of ammonium nitrate,74 neither OSHA 
nor EPA list ammonium nitrate as an extremely hazardous 
substance.75  Even though EPA has issued official alerts on the 
explosive potential of ammonium nitrate,76 neither agency has 
revised its regulations for ammonium nitrate facilities since 
 
66. Id. at 4. 
67. Fernandez, supra note 63. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 7. 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  
73. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 8. 
74. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.109 (2015). 
75. See DANA A. SHEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43070, REGULATION 
OF FERTILIZERS: AMMONIUM NITRATE AND ANHYDROUS AMMONIA 9–10 (2013). 
76. See CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 5; CHEMICAL SAFETY ALERT, 
supra note 9, at 2. 
9
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1971.77  Presently, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
is the primary regulating body of ammonium nitrate. While DHS 
lists ammonium nitrate as hazardous, it only requires certain 
chemical facilities to report possession of ammonium nitrate.78 
The lack of regulation—combined with the distribution of 
limited oversight across so many agencies—are of serious 
concern, considering that roughly 7.5 million tons of ammonium 
nitrate were produced in the United States in 2010,79 and 
853,093 tons of ammonium nitrate fertilizer were used in 2012.80  
While the total number of facilities producing ammonium nitrate 
fertilizer in the United States is unknown, “over 1300 facilities 
reported having ammonium nitrate to DHS.”81  Regardless of the 
exact number, it is clear a significant amount of ammonium 
nitrate is maintained in storage facilities throughout the United 
States. Discussed in greater detail below are the current 
ammonium nitrate safety regulations that OSHA, EPA, and DHS 
have promulgated to date. 
A.  Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 
OSHA is responsible for setting and enforcing regulations to 
protect workers from hazards in the workplace, including 
exposure to hazardous chemicals.82  In 1992, OSHA adopted its 
Process Safety Management (“PSM”) standard “to prevent 
catastrophic workplace incidents involving highly hazardous 
chemicals.”83 PSM requires companies to implement a variety of 
safety initiatives, “such as conducting hazard analyses and 
 
77. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 23. 
78. Id. at 2, 9–10. 
79. See CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT INDUSTRIAL 
REPORTS: FERTILIZERS AND RELATED CHEMICALS (2010). 
80. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 1–2.  
81. Id. at 13. 
82. Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 
1590 (“To assure safe and healthful working conditions for working men and 
women by authorizing enforcement of the standards developed under the Act; by 
assisting and encouraging the States in their efforts to assure safe and healthful 
working conditions; by providing for research, information, education, and 
training in the field of occupational safety and health; and for other purposes.”). 
83. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 5; see also 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1910.119 (2015). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/3
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developing emergency plans,” to prevent catastrophic incidents.84  
However, ammonium nitrate facilities are not subject to 
regulation under PSM, as OSHA has not listed ammonium 
nitrate as a highly hazardous chemical subject to PSM 
requirements.85  The PSM standard also contains an exemption 
for retail facilities, which would exempt most ammonium nitrate 
fertilizer facilities from regulation.86 
“OSHA considered adding ammonium nitrate along with 
other highly reactive chemicals to its list of PSM-covered 
substances in the late 1990s.”87  This proposal was shelved in 
2001, but new discussions of modifying PSM regulations to 
include ammonium nitrate have precipitated following the West, 
Texas disaster.88 
B.  Environmental Protection Agency 
Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) Amendments of 1990, 
EPA’s Risk Management Program (“RMP”) requires facilities 
handling particular chemicals to plan how to prevent and 
mitigate chemical accidents.89  EPA’s RMP rule was adopted in 
1996 to prevent catastrophic offsite environmental damage from 
accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances.90  The 
Program “requires covered facilities to develop a Risk 
Management Plan, implement various safety programs, and 
analyze offsite consequences from potential accidents.”91  RMP 
 
84. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 5.  
85. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119 app. A. 
86. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.119(a)(ii)(B)(2)(i). 
87. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 6.  
88. In response to Executive Order 13650, OSHA requests comment on 
potential revisions to its Process Safety Management (PSM) standard and 
potential changes to PSM enforcement policies. See Process Safety Management 
and Prevention of Major Chemical Accidents, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,756 (proposed Dec. 
9, 2013) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910). 
89. SHEA ET AL., supra note 75, at 10; see Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, §§ 301, 304, 104 Stat. 2399, 2563–74, 2576–77 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)–(s) (1994)); see also CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 
1, at 8.  
90. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 5. See generally Chemical 
Accident Prevention Provisions, 40 C.F.R. pt. 68 (2015). 
91. Statement of Moure-Eraso, supra note 56, at 5; see SHEA ET AL., supra 
note 75, at 10 (“RMPs summarize the potential threat of an unanticipated 
11
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requirements apply to facilities the EPA Administrator 
determines “pose the greatest risk of causing death, injury, or 
serious adverse effects to human health or the environment from 
accidental releases.”92  In listing substances, the Administrator 
considers “the severity of any acute adverse health effects 
associated with accidental releases of the substance,” “the 
likelihood of accidental releases of the substance,” and “the 
potential magnitude of human exposure to accidental releases of 
the substance.”93  Any facility storing a listed chemical above 
threshold quantities must “take specific steps to prevent and 
prepare for chemical accidents.”94  However, ammonium nitrate 
is not a listed chemical and therefore not subject to RMP 
requirements.95 
Additionally, the Emergency Planning and Community 
Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (“EPCRA”) established authorities for 
emergency planning and preparedness and emergency release 
notification reporting, among other things.96  Under Section 312 
of EPCRA, facilities with certain hazardous chemicals in amounts 
at or above threshold levels—including ammonium nitrate in 
some circumstances—are required to submit annual chemical 
inventory forms to state and local authorities to help emergency 
response officials prepare for and respond to chemical incidents.97  
Ammonium nitrate is also regulated under Section 311 of 
EPRCA.98  Section 311 requires owners or operators of local 
facilities covered by the OSHA to submit a Material Safety Data 
Sheet (“MSDS”) for each “hazardous chemical” stored at the 
facility.99  The MDMS reports are then given to the applicable 
State Emergency Response Commissions (“SERCs”), Local 
Emergency Planning Committees (“LEPCs”), and local fire 
 
emissions into the ambient air of certain dangerous chemicals and facilities’ 
plans to prevent such releases and mitigate any damage.”). 
92. SHEA ET AL., supra note 75, at 10. 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(4)(A) (2012). 
94. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 8. 
95. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 68.130 (2015) (listing substances regulated under 
RMP).  
96. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No.  99-499, tit. III, 100 Stat. 1613, 1728–58 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 11001–11050 (1988)).  
97. 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a)(1). 
98. Id. § 11021. 
99. Id. § 11021(a)(1). 
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department, to develop and implement local plans for coping with 
potential releases of hazardous chemicals.100  However, EPRCA 
Section 311 excludes “fertilizer held for sale by a retailer to the 
ultimate customer” from regulation as a “hazardous chemical.”101 
C.  Department of Homeland Security 
The DHS is required to “regulate the sale and transfer of 
ammonium nitrate by an ammonium nitrate facility. . .to prevent 
the misappropriation or use of ammonium nitrate in an act of 
terrorism.”102  For purposes of enhancing chemical facility 
security, DHS adopted the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism 
Standards (“CFATS”) program, which requires facilities 
possessing certain chemicals at or above threshold quantities—
including some types of ammonium nitrate—to submit reports to 
DHS with information about the facility and the regulated 
chemicals present on site.103  Based on the degree of risk posed by 
each facility, DHS determines which chemicals and facilities 
must meet regulatory security requirements.104  DHS lists 
“chemicals of interest and the screening threshold quantities for 
each” chemical required to comply with CFATS.105  In 
determining chemicals of interest, DHS considers each chemical 
in the context of three threats: release, theft or diversion, and 
sabotage or contamination.106 Ammonium nitrate is a chemical of 
interest, classified as posing a threat of theft and release.107 
However, this requirement does not apply to all facilities 
with ammonium nitrate.108  Only facilities storing ammonium 
 
100. Id. § 11021(a)(1)(A)−(C). 
101. Id. § 11021(e)(5). 
102. 6 U.S.C. § 488a(a). 
103. See 6 C.F.R. pt. 27 (2015). DHS issued the CFATS regulations in 2007 
and the list initially included 322 chemicals of interest and the screening 
threshold quantities for each chemical. See id. app. A. 
104. Id. 
105. Critical Infrastructure Protection: DHS Needs to Improve Its Risk 
Assessments and Outreach for Chemical Facilities: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Cybersecurity Infrastructure Prot. & Sec. Techs. of the H. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (statement of Stephen L. Caldwell, Director 
of Homeland Security and Justice). 
106. 6 C.F.R. § 27.203.  
107. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 10 tbl.1.  
108. Id. at 10.  
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nitrate in threshold quantities are required to report.109  Certain 
agricultural producers are also exempt from DHS’s reporting 
requirements.110  Furthermore, DHS’s reporting requirement 
applies only to ammonium nitrate stored “in transportable 
containers such as cylinders, bulk bags, bottles (inside or outside 
of boxes),” or tanks.111 
Following the explosion at the West Fertilizer Company 
facility, policymakers expressed concern over the lack of oversight 
and requested information about the regulation of agricultural 
fertilizers.112  On August 1, 2013, President Obama signed 
Executive Order 13,650, which directed government agencies 
with regulatory authority to take additional measures to further 
improve chemical facility safety and reduce security risks 
associated with hazardous chemicals.113  Multiple government 
agencies have also attempted to educate the public on the 
potential dangers associated with ammonium nitrate storage. In 
2013, EPA, in conjunction with OSHA and the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, issued a chemical advisory for 
the safe storage, handling, and management of ammonium 
nitrate.114  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) 
also recently released a report stating that without improved 
monitoring of facilities that store ammonium nitrate and 
coordination between U.S. agencies, federal regulators “will not 
know the extent to which dangerous conditions at some facilities 
may continue to exist.”115  Accidents like the explosion at the 
West Fertilizer facility are due to management’s failure to take 
the necessary steps to avert a preventable fire and explosion, and 
from the inability of federal, state, and local regulatory agencies 
to identify serious hazards and correct them.116  The GAO report 
 
109. Id. at 10. 
110. Id. “Pursuant to its authority under 6 C.F.R. § 27.210(c), DHS has 
extended the deadline for submitting CFATS reports until further notice for 
certain agricultural production facilities, such as farms, ranches, turfgrass 
growers, golf courses, nurseries, and public and private parks.” Id. at 10 n.24; 
see Notice to Agricultural Facilities About Requirement To Complete DHS’ 
Chemical Security Assessment Tool, 73 Fed. Reg. 1640 (Jan. 9, 2008).  
111. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 10; see 6 C.F.R. § 27.203(c). 
112. SHEA ET AL., supra note 75, at 1.  
113. Exec. Order No. 13,650, 78 Fed. Reg. 48,029 (Aug. 1, 2013).  
114. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 2.  
115. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 45.  
116. Id.  
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highlights the fact that while agencies have taken steps to 
address the issue, they have not solved the problem. However, the 
CAA’s general duty clause provides EPA the explicit authority to 
impose the necessary safety protocols to prevent these 
catastrophic accidents. 
IV. GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE 
In 1984, a chemical facility’s accidental and sudden release of 
methyl isocyanate killed and injured thousands of people in 
Bhopal, India.117  Shortly thereafter, a similar toxic spill took 
place in Institute, West Virginia that sent hundreds to the 
hospital.118  The accident in West Virginia raised significant 
questions about the possibility of other such accidents occurring 
in the U.S.119  In response to public concern over the potential 
release of hazardous substances, Congress passed the CAA 
Amendments of 1990, which established the Accidental Release 
Prevention Program.120  Specifically, Section 112(r)(1) established 
a “general duty” to prevent the accidental release of extremely 
hazardous substances. 
Section 112(r)(1) is an important part of the federal chemical 
accidental release prevention program and is more commonly 
referred to as the general duty clause. Under this clause, the 
owners and operators of facilities producing, processing, 
handling, or storing any extremely hazardous substances have a 
general duty to prevent an accidental release and to minimize the 
consequences of any such release.121  The definition of an 
“extremely hazardous substance” is very broad. Legislative 
history indicates the statute was intended to include substances 
“which may or may not be listed or otherwise identified by any 
Government agency which may as the result of short-term 
 
117. CHEM. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS & PREVENTION OFFICE, U.S. EPA, 
EPA-550-B00-002, GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL DUTY 
CLAUSE CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION 112(r)(1) 2 (2000) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION 
OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE]; Van R. Delhotal, The General Duty to Prevent 
Accidental Releases of Extremely Hazardous Substances: The General Duty 
Clause of Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act, 13 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 61, 64 (1993). 
118. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 2.  
119. Id. 
120. See Delhotal, supra note 117, at 77.  
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (2012).  
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exposures associated with releases to the air cause death, injury 
or property damage due to its toxicity, reactivity, flammability, 
volatility, or corrosivity.”122  This does not, however, include 
public health impacts resulting from “chronic” exposures to 
releases over a long period of time.123  Rather, “an accidental 
release is one which causes or may cause immediate (or near 
term) death, serious injury, or substantial property damage as a 
result of exposure to an extremely hazardous substance.”124  
Section 112(r)(1) opened a new and potentially broad scheme to 
assure facilities are operated safely. 
Owners and operators have three primary obligations under 
the general duty clause: (1) to “identify hazards which may result 
from accidental releases using appropriate hazard assessment 
techniques,” (2) to “design and maintain a safe facility taking 
such steps as are necessary to prevent releases, and” (3) to 
“minimize the consequences of accidental releases which do 
occur.”125  Although each of these obligations requires owners and 
operators to undertake a series of measures, the general duty 
clause does not specifically prescribe these measures.126  To 
determine owner and operator obligations under the general duty 
clause, EPA will look to the hazards and standards identified by 
the facility or industry.127  If such standards or practices do not 
exist, “owners or operators are responsible for identifying hazards 
and taking appropriate measures to prevent releases and 
minimize the consequences of a release.”128  Accordingly, owners 
and operators must conduct a hazard assessment to determine if 
the facility’s design, maintenance practices, operation procedures, 
and mitigation measures meet or exceed any applicable industry 
practices or standards or state or federal regulations.129  When 
developing the general duty clause, the Senate Committee 
identified eleven elements that could be generically applicable to 
 
122. S. REP. NO. 101-228 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3596.  
123. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 10 n.2. 
(citing S. REP. NO. 101-228).   
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 11. 
126. Id. at 12. 
127. Id. 
128. Id.  
129. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 12. 
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EPA accident prevention regulations: (1) hazard evaluation (that 
is, hazard assessment), (2) maintenance of safety documentation, 
(3) regular safety reviews, (4) operating procedures, (5) operator 
training, (6) preventative maintenance, (7) release prevention 
measures, (8) release detection systems, (9) upset and accident 
release investigations, (10) alert systems and emergency response 
plans, and (11) program audits.130  While the Senate Committee 
acknowledged that this list was not comprehensive, it provides a 
useful outline for addressing non-formal hazard assessment 
problems.131 
For enforcement purposes, EPA looks to OSHA’s general duty 
clause for clarity. CAA Section 112(r)(1) specifically states that 
the general duty clause applies “in the same manner and to the 
same extent as [OHSA’s general duty clause,] section 654, title 29 
[of the United States Code].”132 
Previous litigation and administrative hearings on OHSA’s 
general duty clause have formed the essential elements for a 
cause of action.133  Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Commission v. Duriron Co. held that an agency must prove four 
things in order to establish a general duty clause violation: 
(1) [t]he employer failed to render its workplace free of a 
hazard, (2) the hazard was recognized either by the cited 
employer or generally within the employer’s industry, (3) the 
hazard was causing or was likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm, and (4) there was a feasible means by which the 
employer could have eliminated or materially reduced the 
hazard.134 
Accordingly, “[t]o constitute a recognized hazard” within the 
meaning of the general duty clause of the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1), “the dangerous potential of 
a condition or activity must actually be known either to the 
particular employer or generally in the industry.”135 
 
130. S. REP. NO. 101-228 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3624–27. 
131. Id. at 3627. 
132. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(1) (2012).  
133. See IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 11 
n.4. 
134. Delhotal, supra note 117, at 99–100.   
135. Usery v. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co., 568 F.2d 902, 910 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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A.  Legal Interpretation 
While the definition of a hazard within the scope of OSHA’s 
general duty clause is supported by legal precedence, the question 
of what constitutes a foreseeable hazard within the bounds of 
EPA’s enforcement authority is one of first impression. No 
previous litigation, administrative decisions, or EPA guidelines 
have been issued as to the limits of the general duty clause’s 
applicability. Moreover, the amendment’s legislative history 
provides negligible insight into the extent a chemical substance 
may be classified as “extremely hazardous,” subject to the 
obligations of Section 112(r)(1). However, common law and public 
nuisance jurisprudence provide some perspective on how to apply 
the general duty clause. 
The CAA’s general duty clause codified the common law duty 
to prevent public nuisance, defined as “the doing of or the failure 
to do something that injuriously affects the safety, health, or 
morals of the public.”136  Furthermore, a public nuisance “may be 
enjoined because harm is threatened that would be significant if 
it occurred, and that would make the nuisance actionable . . . 
although no harm has yet resulted.”137  Accordingly, where 
irreparable injury is threatened, a court may act by injunction to 
prevent the harm before it occurs.138  Such interferences with 
public safety include the storage of potentially explosive 
material.139  Regardless of the likelihood of an interference 
occurring, it is a facility’s common law duty to guard against the 
threat of irreparable injury.140  This principle underscores the 
very purpose of the CAA’s general duty clause, and appropriately 
justifies the application of such duty to facilities producing, 
storing, and transporting ammonium nitrate fertilizer. 
 
136. Commonwealth v. S. Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. Co., 205 S.W. 
581, 583 (Ky. 1918). 
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821F cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
138. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS 165 n.8 (5th ed. 
1984). 
139. See State v. Excelsior Powder Mfg. Co., 169 S.W. 267, 273 (Mo. 1914). 
140. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 138. 
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B.  Application to Ammonium Nitrate Facilities 
To establish a cause of action under Section 112(r)(1), the 
agency must demonstrate that: (1) the facility is a stationary 
source, (2) the substance is extremely hazardous, and (3) there is 
the potential for an accidental release.141  For purposes of the 
federal chemical accidental release prevention program, a 
“stationary source” means any buildings, structures, equipment, 
installations, or substance emitting stationary activities from 
which an accidental release may occur.142  Accordingly, any 
facility producing, processing, handling, or storing ammonium 
nitrate fertilizer constitutes a stationary source within the 
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(C). However, deciphering what 
an extremely hazardous substance and accidental release 
actually are, within the context of Section 112(r), is a bit more 
complex. 
As discussed above, the definition of an “extremely hazardous 
substance” is very broad. Section 112(r)(1) states that the general 
duty applies to “any substance listed pursuant to paragraph (3) 
[EPA’s list of substances known to be extremely hazardous] or 
any other extremely hazardous substance.”143  Although 
ammonium nitrate is not a listed substance, legislative history 
indicates the statute includes substances “which may as the 
result of short-term exposures associated with releases to the air 
cause death, injury or property damage due to their toxicity, 
reactivity, flammability, volatility, or corrosivity.”144  Under 
certain circumstances, ammonium nitrate may be considered 
extremely hazardous.145  Ammonium nitrate melts at a 
temperature of 337 degrees Fahrenheit and starts thermal 
decomposition.146  Although unusual, ammonium nitrate has a 
reactive and volatile potential to explode when thermal 
decomposition occurs in “a confined space and the heat and gases 
 
141. See IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 10–
11. 
142. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(C) (2012). 
143. Id. § 7412(r)(1). 
144. S. REP. NO. 101-228 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 
3596. 
145. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 16. 
146. Id. at 4. 
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created are not able to dissipate.”147  Conditions such as 
“confinement or self-confinement (when stored in relatively large 
quantities), contamination (presence of impurities) and [a] 
thermal source (fire or explosion for example)”  increase the 
likelihood of the release of extremely hazardous substances 
resulting in a catastrophic event.148  The events of West, Texas; 
Toulouse, France; and Port Neal, Iowa demonstrate that 
accidental explosions of ammonium nitrate do occur, and, when 
they do, they have a high impact on the surrounding area, 
resulting in the loss of life and destruction of property. Thus, 
ammonium nitrate, under the appropriate conditions, is an 
extremely hazardous substance within the general duty clause’s 
broad scheme to assure facilities are operated safely. 
The general duty clause also requires that the release of an 
extremely hazardous substance be accidental. For purposes of the 
federal chemical accidental release prevention program, “[t]he 
term ‘accidental release’ means an unanticipated emission of a 
regulated substance or other extremely hazardous substance into 
the ambient air from a stationary source.”149  As previously 
discussed, thermal decomposition of ammonium nitrate creates 
toxic gases containing ammonia, nitrogen oxides, and nitric 
acid.150  Confined storage spaces can cause these gasses to 
accumulate, increasing pressure to dangerous levels.151  Unable 
to dissipate, the heat and pressure produced by thermal 
decomposition can result in an unanticipated release of gaseous 
byproducts and the detonation of ammonium nitrate.152  
Accordingly, the release of any quantity of ammonium nitrate, 
any byproducts of ammonium nitrate decomposition, and the 
chemicals resulting from the explosion of ammonium nitrate into 
the ambient air constitutes an “accidental release,” as defined by 
42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(A). 
 
147. Id. at 4–5. 
148. Dechy et al., supra note 23, at 134. 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r)(2)(A) (2012). 
150. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 4; Dechy et al., supra note 23, at 
134. 
151. Id. at 5. 
152. See id.   
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C.  Duties Imposed on Ammonium Nitrate Facilities 
Should the general duty clause apply, the owners and 
operators of ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities have an 
obligation to: “identify hazards which may result from accidental 
releases,” “design and maintain a safe facility,” and “minimize the 
consequences of accidental releases which do occur.”153  Owners 
and operators must then conduct hazard assessments to ensure 
the facility’s design, maintenance, operation, and mitigation 
measures meet or exceed any applicable industry practices or 
standards.154  Therefore, ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities 
must look to specific safety and handling instructions established 
by organizations such as the National Fire Protection Association 
(NFPA),155 Compressed Gas Association (CGA),156 ResponsibleAg 
(RA)157 and the National Safety Council (NSC).158 
These directives include procedures to: avoid heating 
ammonium nitrate in a confined space (e.g., processes involving 
 
153. IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE, supra note 117, at 11. 
154. Id. at 15. 
155. CHEMICAL SAFETY, supra note 1, at 23 n.45 (“NFPA is an independent 
nonprofit organization that convenes technical committees to develop national 
codes and standards intended to minimize the possibility and effects of fire and 
other risks.”); see NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 400: HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
CODE ch. 11 (2013) [hereinafter NFPA 400] (setting forth specific safety 
procedures including building design, storage in bags, storage in bulk, and fire 
protection). 
156. “The Compressed Gas Association (“CGA”) is an organization 
dedicated to the development and promotion of safety standards and safe 
practices in the industrial gas industry.” 
About Us, COMPRESSED GAS ASS’N, http://www.cganet.com/about.php 
[http://perma.cc/F4H6-W9A2].  
157. Agricultural Retailers Association (“ARA”) is a “non-profit trade 
association that represents the interests of agricultural retailers and 
distributors across the United States on legislative and regulatory issues. As the 
political voice for agricultural retailers and distributors, ARA advocates on 
critical issues, educates legislators and collaborates with regulatory officials on 
important issues affecting the industry.” Who We Are And What We Do, AGRIC. 
RETAILERS ASS’N, http://www.aradc.org/aradc/about/about [http://perma.cc/S3FG-
7A69].  
158. “[T]he National Safety Council is a nonprofit organization with the 
mission to save lives by preventing injuries and deaths at work, in homes and 
communities, and on the road through leadership, research, education and 
advocacy.” About the National Safety Council, NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, 
http://www.nsc.org/learn/about/Pages/about-nsc.aspx [http://perma.cc/96PR-
SJSN].  
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ammonium nitrate should be designed to avoid this 
possibility);159 avoid localized heating of ammonium nitrate, 
potentially leading to development of high temperature areas;160 
avoid contamination of ammonium nitrate with combustible 
materials or organic substances such as oils and waxes;161 
“[m]aintain the pH of [ammonium nitrate] solutions within a safe 
operating range of the process”;162 and implement appropriate 
fire prevention and accident mitigation methods.163  Under the 
general duty clause, these guidelines become legal obligations for 
the owners and operators of ammonium nitrate fertilizer 
facilities. Failure to abide by industry practices or standards 
could result in significant fines against owners and operators not 
in compliance, thus, providing a strong incentive for all 
ammonium nitrate facilities to implement measures to prevent 
releases and minimize the consequences of an accident. 
V. CONCLUSION 
“No other single chemical has caused more widespread harm 
to the public in preventable accidents than ammonium 
 
159. FERTILIZER INST., SAFETY AND SECURITY GUIDELINES FOR THE STORAGE 
AND TRANSPORTATION OF FERTILIZER GRADE AMMONIUM NITRATE AT FERTILIZER 
RETAIL FACILITIES 8 (2014) (“Bins should have appropriate ventilation and be 
constructed to self-ventilate in the event of a fire to avoid pressurization. . . .  
Bulk piles should not exceed 40 feet in height. Piles should be no higher than 36 
inches below roof. Piles should not contact supporting beams or other related 
supporting structures.”). 
160. NFPA 400, supra note 155, at §§ 11.3.2.2.3, 11.3.2.2.5. 
161. FERTILIZER INST., supra note 159, at 4–5 (“Avoid contamination of 
[fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate] with combustible materials or organic 
substances including, but not limited to: (i) organic chemicals, acids, or other 
corrosive materials; (ii) compressed flammable gases; (iii) flammable and 
combustible materials, solids or liquids; and, (iv) other contaminating 
substances such as wood chips, organic materials, chlorides, phosphorus, finely 
divided metals, charcoals, diesel fuels and oils, sulfur.”); NFPA 400, supra note 
155, §§ 11.3.2.3.3.1–11.3.2.3.3.2. 
162. CHEMICAL ADVISORY, supra note 4, at 7. 
163. Id. at 8–9 (“[Ammonium nitrate] storage areas should be equipped 
with an automatic sprinkler system, or have an automatic fire detection and 
alarm system if the areas are not continuously occupied.”); FERTILIZER INST., 
supra note 159, at 7–8 (“[Ammonium nitrate] storage areas should have 
automatic fire detection and alarm systems if the areas are not continuously 
occupied. . . . Situations where water supplies, rate of flow, and fire hydrants are 
not available should be accounted for in the emergency response plan.”). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol33/iss1/3
LEVINSON - POSTMACRO 12/16/2015  12:40 PM 
2015] REGULATING AMMONIUM NITRATE 75 
nitrate.”164  The CAA’s general duty clause offers a legitimate 
alternative for regulating the production and storage of 
ammonium nitrate. Evidence from the many serious prior 
incidents involving ammonium nitrate fertilizer facilities clearly 
demonstrates the dangerous potential of unanticipated releases of 
this extremely hazardous substance. The magnitude of these 
incidents illustrates the need to apply the CAA’s general duty 
clause, a federal regulation that is already in place and would 
adequately govern these dangerous conditions. Accordingly, 
facilities producing, processing, handling, or storing ammonium 
nitrate should have a duty to prevent an accidental release and to 
minimize the consequences of any such release, and should be 
regulated as such. 
 
 
164. Fernandez, supra note 63. 
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